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PREFACE 
The gradual integration of financial markets, the spurring of technological progress, the 
reduction of transaction costs and the increase of migration flows in many regions of the world, 
all spillovers of globalization, have impacted on employment outcomes and will continue to do 
so in the future. Despite success in creating more jobs in the course of economic expansion, 
welfare gains vary widely between countries and individuals. The creation of more and better 
jobs remains a key challenge and in light of this the OECD Development Centre has produced 
two volumes with the objective of generating dialogue on innovative policy options. The first, 
Policy Coherence for Development: Migration and Developing Countries, provided an overview on 
how international migration and the better management of people flows can contribute to 
development in both host and home countries. The second, Is Informal Normal? Towards More and 
Better Jobs in Developing Countries, provides evidence that informal employment is pervasive in 
the world, that it is persisting but that it includes a certain element of heterogeneity within the 
group of workers who do work informally. 
Many of the newly created jobs have neither been able to provide a minimum standard of 
living nor to provide adequate social protection. Indeed, some argue that many of the newly 
created jobs are ‚bad‛ jobs, locking people into a vicious circle of low pay, high risk and 
insufficient prospects to climb the social ladder.  
As one of the OECD’s ‚enhanced engagement countries‛, China offers an interesting 
example to study this phenomenon. Over the past decade, China has experienced major 
economic and social transformations. Greater integration into the world economy and structural 
reforms have pushed it into a higher growth path. While sustained economic growth has 
contributed to bringing extreme poverty down, high and often growing disparities in 
employment opportunities, coupled with a limited coverage of social protection systems, have 
been associated with rapidly widening earnings and income inequalities. Although China is 
committed to fighting poverty and inequality (as exemplified by the Chinese government's focus 
on "economic growth balanced with social harmony and stability"), growing segmentation in the 
labour market has made it increasingly difficult to create a harmonious labour market, where 
mobility is free and well-being sustained. 
This paper looks into the plight of labour migrants in urban China and makes a 
contribution to the literature by using nationally representative data to determine if and how 
labour migrants are discriminated in the labour market. While rural migrants may indeed be 
paid less in urban China, the analysis in this paper shows that this is in fact due to their 
individual human capital characteristics. However, it is shown that labour migrants are indeed 
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discriminated, not in pay, but in the free choice of sector in which they work. Being barred out of 
the formal sector, they are in effect denied fair access to health and educational services. 
While a complete cancelation of the Chinese hukou system may not be feasible, this paper 
provides evidence of a more pressing issue and one where policy may have a role. Access to 
basic social services, regardless of employment status, is fundamental in ensuring the well-being 
of workers and their families. Additionally, other than reducing the number of jobs, an economic 
slowdown risks to have a significant impact on the quality of jobs, potentially eroding the 
working conditions of some specific groups and rendering them more vulnerable. In China, this 
is evident in the potential massive flow of return migrants which will eventually deepen pre-
existing social strains. Therefore, providing portable social security should also form part of the 
policy agenda. 
Research in this area will continue at the OECD Development Centre, notably under the 
work programme entitled "Global Development Outlook". 
 
 
Javier Santiso 
Director and Chief Development Economist 
OECD Development Centre 
June 2009 
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ABSTRACT 
The rapid and massive increase in rural-to-urban worker flows to the coast of China has 
drawn recent attention to the welfare of migrants working in urban regions, particularly to their 
working conditions and pay; serious concern is raised regarding pay discrimination against rural 
migrants. This paper uses data from a random draw of the 2005 Chinese national census survey 
to shed more light on the discrimination issue, by making comparisons of earnings and the sector 
of work between rural migrants on one hand, and urban residents and urban migrants on the 
other. Contrary to popular belief, we find no earnings discrimination against rural migrants 
compared to urban residents. However, rural migrants are found to be discriminated in terms of 
the sector in which they work, with a vast majority working in the informal sector lacking 
adequate social protection. 
 
JEL Classification: O15, R23, J24, J71 
Keywords: Migration, China, Discrimination, Informal Employment 
RÉSUMÉ 
L'augmentation rapide et massive des mouvements ruraux-à-urbains d'ouvriers vers la 
côte de la Chine a appelé à l'attention récente le bien-être des migrants travaillant dans des 
régions urbaines, en particulier à leurs conditions et leur salaire de travail; la préoccupation a 
d’autant plus augmenté concernant la discrimination de salaire contre les migrants ruraux. Ce 
papier emploie des données d'un tirage aléatoire du recensement national chinois de 2005 pour 
éclaircir la question de la discrimination, en faisant des comparaisons de revenus et de secteur de 
travail entre les migrants ruraux d'une part, et les résidents et migrants urbains de l'autre. 
Contrairement à la croyance populaire, nous ne trouvons aucune discrimination de revenus 
contre les migrants ruraux comparés aux résidents urbains. Cependant, les migrants ruraux 
s'avèrent être distingués en termes de secteur dans lequel ils travaillent, une grande majorité 
d’entre eux travaillant dans le secteur informel, caractérisé par un manque d’accès à une 
protection sociale adéquate. 
 
Classification JEL : O15, R23, J24, J71 
Mots clés : Migration, Chine, Discrimination, Emploi informel 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A combination of factors in recent years, notably the increasing rural-urban income gap1 
and the easing of internal migration restrictions (Cai, 2000), has led to a tremendous increase in 
rural-to-urban migration in China, a result largely due to individuals in search of work in the 
coastal regions. Indeed, the number of migrants has increased significantly over the years from 
an estimate of 68 million in 1996 (Liang, 2001) to one of nearly 140 million in 2003 (Huang and 
Zhan, 2005). According to nationally representative census data from 2005, migrant workers 
account for more than 20 pour cent of the labour force in the urban labour market2. There is little 
doubt as to whether the influx of migrants into urban China has contributed to economic growth 
(Liang, 2001; Song and Zhang, 2003), but concern prevails as to the implications of the 
accompanying geo-demographic transformation on individual welfare. 
Particular interest is raised on how migrants fare in the urban labour market, especially in 
comparison to their urban resident counterparts. Research shows that migrants 
disproportionately take up jobs in informal sectors, are paid less, are less likely to be covered by 
urban social security systems and occasionally find it difficult to get their settled salaries from 
their employers on time and enforced (China Labour Bulletin, 2008). The situation is exacerbated 
by China’s resident registration (hukou) system, as most rural migrants retain their rural hukou 
status, despite the fact that they may spend a significant amount of time in urban areas. Hence, 
the potential for discrimination on wages is evident for migrants with rural hukou status but it 
may also be present in the general ability to access formal sector jobs. 
This paper sets out to answer whether migrants are really worse off in urban labour 
markets in China. Our starting point is a common one found in the research literature on 
discrimination: the notion that wage gaps may owe to either differing levels of individual human 
capital brought to the labour market or from differing sets of skill-prices offered on this market. 
Indeed, it is a relevant starting point as it carries notable policy implications. If, for instance, rural 
migrants are paid less as a result of lower skills brought to the urban labour market, reforming 
the urban labour market will have little effect on their well-being, whereas providing them with 
education and appropriate skills will enable them to exploit better labour market opportunities. 
However, if migrants have significantly lower wages compared to urban residents3 with 
                                                     
1. The most recently published ratio is estimated at 3.2:1 (China Statistical Yearbook,  National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2007) 
2. In some relatively developed coastal regions, such as those of Guangdong and Fujian, the share of 
migrants is greater than 50%. 
3. For the remainder of the text, ‚urban resident‛ is meant to mean non-migrant urban resident. 
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identical characteristics, the root cause of wage differences could be discrimination. Reforming 
the labour market, if this is the case, would lead to an increase in welfare for migrants. Moreover, 
looking for differences within the subgroups of migrants will provide additional insight into the 
determinants of discrimination. 
We first estimate a multinomial logit model to determine the factors determining the 
choice of employment sector and then apply the results to a decomposition analysis to test for 
the existence of wage discrimination. The Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) decomposition framework 
(Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) provides a useful analytical instrument with which to face the 
question of discrimination and is often applied to compute the explained (endowment) effect and 
the unexplained (discrimination) effect in potential discriminatory cases of gender or black/white 
income differentials. We follow the literature in this sense but the comparison between the two 
groups, rural migrants and urban residents, is multifaceted as it involves two dimensions of 
potential discrimination instead of one, and our results hinge on this dichotomy. The first 
dimension is hukou status (rural vs. urban), while the second is migrant status (migrant vs. 
resident). We therefore introduce another reference group -namely urban migrants4- to 
distinguish these two effects. As urban migrants are different from urban residents only in terms 
of migrant status, we interpret the positive unexplained figure of the OB decomposition as a 
premium associated with migration (or a selection effect); and as urban migrants and rural 
migrants differ only in hukou status, we interpret the unexplained figure of the OB 
decomposition as discrimination against rural hukou status.  
As we are concerned by the possibility of segmentation in the urban labour market, 
another feature we take into account is the distribution of individuals in the formal and informal 
sectors as this will have an effect on income and well-being. This issue is also at the heart of 
policy preoccupations with respect to the working conditions of rural migrants and in particular 
their access to good secure jobs. In light of this we apply a Brown decomposition exercise (an 
extended version of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition) between and within the different groups 
and report the findings in Appendix 25. Secondly, because sectoral segmentation can have a 
substantial impact on social security coverage despite having a possible limited impact on 
income, we also apply an OB decomposition directly to differences in sectoral distribution. 
The paper uses a recent nationally representative dataset, a one-fifth random draw from 
the 1 per cent census data of China, to explore the issues raised above. Results show that most of 
the income differential between rural migrants and urban residents can be explained by 
differences in individual characteristics. However by using urban migrants as a ‚control‛ group, 
we find that the presumed inexistence of a discrimination effect we obtain while comparing rural 
migrants and urban residents is the result of a counterbalance between a discrimination effect 
against rural hukou status and a premium effect accrued by migrants. As for sectoral distribution, 
a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition indicates that all migrants (both rural and urban) are 
                                                     
4. Migrants with an urban hukou status moving from one urban region to another. 
5. Cai and Wang (2006) also find discrimination along gender lines in China. We therefore report gender 
dissagregated results in Appendix 3. 
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discriminated along sector choice6. The extent of discrimination is larger for rural migrants 
indicating a further discrimination against rural hukou status. 
In terms of income, rural migrants enjoy a premium associated with migration and suffer 
discrimination in urban labour markets simultaneously. The reason that they earn less when we 
compare them with urban residents is due to their lower levels of human capital. Increasing the 
education level of rural migrants and providing them with useful skills will help increase their 
income and earning opportunities. As both rural and urban migrants face unfair treatment in 
sector choice, reforming the labour market, especially by removing sector barriers can help 
increase employment in the formal sector and facilitate earnings mobility for migrants. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section II provides a short discussion on the 
institutional background and a literature review on labour market segmentation in China. 
Section III describes the data. Section IV presents and discusses the model specification and 
Section V reports our basic empirical results, where we compare rural migrants and urban 
residents. In Section VI, we present a more profound analysis comparing different groups. The 
last section concludes. 
                                                     
6. More than 80% of the difference is unexplained 
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II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several articles provide an overview of the institutional background of China’s rural-
urban migration, with particular emphasis on the hukou registration system; among them Cai 
(2000), Zhao (2005), Deng and Gustafsson (2006) and de la Rupelle (2007). Despite the several 
reforms to the system since the 1970s, deliberate discrimination of migrants in cities remained 
legal until very recently, in order to reduce competition of rural migrants in urban centres (Cai, 
2000). Today, urban China faces the challenge of integrating two distinct labour force groups, 
and it is still unclear as to whether they are complementary or competing for the same jobs. Rural 
migrants, it has been shown, have higher job mobility in the urban labour market and generally 
lower job tenure rates than urban residents (Knight and Yueh, 2003). Although the two groups 
work in seemingly segmented labour markets, competition may be increasing as more internal 
migration and labour market reforms gain pace (Knight and Yueh, 2004). 
Rural migrants in urban centres can be divided into two groups: those who have obtained 
an urban hukou registration and those who have not. Migrants with an urban hukou are registered 
officially as urban residents, a prerequisite to be covered by the urban social security system and 
to gain access to various forms of public assistance. Moreover, once registered as urban residents, 
permanent migrants forfit their rural resident status, their right to agricultural land in their 
community of origin as well as their voting rights on village affairs. Both anecdotal evidence and 
academic research (Deng and Gustafsson, 2006, for example) indicate that rural migrants who 
successfully obtain an urban hukou registration are well integrated in urban society, at least after 
accumulating experience in the urban labour market over time7. 
Alternatively, many rural migrants retain their rural hukou status, whether deliberately or 
not, and thus retain rights on their rural land and a voice on political affairs in their village of 
origin. These migrants are less integrated in urban labour markets compared to permanent 
migrants. They may also find it difficult to gain access to jobs in formal urban sectors due to their 
registration status (Zhao, 2005). As a result, non-urban-registered migrants are often paid less on 
average. Although they may spend a significant amount of time in urban areas, they may 
additionally not be covered by the urban social security system nor be entitled to various other 
benefits. 
 
                                                     
7. Some rural migrants can successfully obtain a permanent urban hukou status after leaving a rural area, 
and therefore are often deemed ‚permanent migrants‛. It should be noted that permanent migrants 
are different from urban migrants with the latter having moved from other urban areas and hence 
holding an urban hukou. We do not consider permanent migrants in our paper. 
 12   © OECD 2009 
 
The hukou system thus creates important distortions and increases inequality in the urban 
Chinese labour market (Whalley and Zhang, 2004) despite the fact that several papers point to 
migration within China as a natural mechanism for rural-urban income convergence (Lin et al., 
2004; Du et al., 2004). In fact, although migrants have been moving to urban labour markets for 
many years, the hukou system has ensured that the urban labour market remains segmented 
opening the possibility of discrimination against those who are not registered in urban centres. 
Research also shows that migrants in China are positively self-selected on the basis of 
(both observed and unobserved) characteristics which increases the likelihood of yielding a 
positive outcome in the labour market8, yet despite these favorable characteristics, evidence of 
discrimination against rural migrants in the urban labour market has been documented. Data 
from the 2002 China Household Income Project (CHIP) shows that migrants themselves perceive 
to be discriminated against in urban labour markets (Demurger et al., 2008). Both casual 
observation and existing research (Meng and Zhang, 2001; UNDP, 2005) indicate that a 
significant share of migrants take up jobs in the informal sector, are paid less and are also less 
likely to be covered by urban social security systems (Wei, 2007). The lack of social security 
coverage is likely to contribute to an important decrease in welfare; a report by the China Labour 
Bulletin (2008), for instance, reported that the current wage gap between urban and rural regions 
would increase from 3-fold to 6-fold in real terms, if we considered the benefits accrued from 
social security. Even worse is that migrants occasionally find it difficult to get their settled 
salaries from their employers on time and enforced9. Despite extensive reforms in minimum 
wage legislation (see The 1994 Labour Law), the large number of migrants working informally 
ensures that the minimum wage is not binding. 
Many empirical papers have analysed the rise in urban labour market segmentation and 
the disparity between the rural and urban sectors in China (see for instance Whalley and Zhang, 
2004; Knight and Li, 2005). Although the relative disadvantages of rural migrants raises concern, 
little has been done to study the determinants of their labour market outcomes and better 
understand labour market outcome differentials between them and urban residents10. 
                                                     
8. For instance, selection has been documented on the basis of level of education, age, health status or 
gender (Kikuchi et al., 2000; Wu, 2008). 
9. The China Labour Bulletin (2008) claims that in 2004 there were 114 997 labour dispute lawsuits filed 
by migrants. 
10. Among the very few, Meng and Zhang (2001) find that educated urban residents are more likely to 
have a white-collar job or to work in wholesale or retail trade occupations. Moreover, despite wage 
discrimination against migrants (which can be as high as 50%), they find that 82% of the 
discrimination is due to inequality between sectors. Meng (2001) finds that migrants with higher 
levels of education and urban labour experience are more likely to be self-employed in the informal 
sector. Shi and Zhang (2006) find that the return to education in the urban labour market is around 
5.4%, and show that education is important in determining higher wages for migrants in urban 
centres. Démurger et al. (2008), decompose annual earnings differences between urban residents and 
rural migrants into four categories (a sectoral effect, a wage effect, an hours worked effect and a 
population effect) and find that migrant workers have a comparative advantage in working in the 
private sector while the opposite holds for urban residents. Moreover, the population effect, the 
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Another related question is whether the urban labour market is segmented with respect 
to the hukou system. Given that an individual’s hukou status may be correlated with the 
individual characteristics of a migrant such as education level, work experience and ability, it is 
difficult to tell whether poor performance in the labour market is due to these characteristics (e.g. 
low human capital) or hukou status. 
Many studies on discrimination use the Oaxaca-Blinder framework to test for 
discrimination in the labour market (the unexplained share of the income differential). Many of 
them, however, use data from different regions at different times and ultimately derive different 
conclusions, in effect making any comparison a difficult task. For instance, Meng and Zhang 
(2001) find that 51 per cent of the wage differential between urban residents and migrants is due 
to unexplained factors (discrimination, loosely speaking) while Dinh and Maurer-Fazio (2004) 
find 25 per cent and Wang (2005) 43 per cent, each using different datasets which focus on 
different regions of the country. Deng (2007), using the China Household Income Project (CHIP) 
data collected by the CASS11 and which reasonably covers the country, finds that 60 per cent of 
the income differential originates from unexplained factors. As commented by Zhao (2005), ‚The 
datasets that have been used in existing research papers are quite varied‛, and in some cases they 
are outdated. In many cases, it can be said that the results cannot be generalised as the data is not 
representative of the entire population of the country. 
In this paper we wish to understand the reason for wage differences in urban labour 
markets between migrants and urban residents. We use a Oaxaca-Blinder model to decompose 
the difference between skill levels and skill-prices. Our research contributes to the literature by 
using a more representative dataset than previous studies, the 1/5th random draw from the 2005 
1 per cent national census, which allows us to distinguish between work in the formal and the 
informal sectors. This is a salient feature when studying migration, as other sample datasets may 
not fully capture all migrants, especially those working informally. Discrimination can appear in 
many forms. By introducing a sectoral breakdown along informal-formal labour market 
segmentation, we gain a more complete and realistic picture of rural migrant labour outcomes in 
urban labour markets.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
underlying individual characteristics of urban residents and migrants, is significantly important, 
signaling that pre-market rather than on-market factors prevail. 
 
11. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
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III. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
III.1 The Data 
The data we use is a one-fifth random draw from the 1 per cent census data of China 
administered by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in 2005. The sample size is around 
2.3 million individuals covering 31 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. We use 
the sampling rule to extrapolate the total population in China, which is 1.29 billion, slightly 
lower than the 1.31 billion referenced in the China Statistical Yearbook (China Statistical 
Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006)12. Generally speaking our data is 
representative of mainland China. This is confirmed by Figure A1 in Appendix 1, where we 
show the weighted sample shares by province compared to the corresponding shares we get 
from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook (CSY). The difference we find is negligible. 
The 1 per cent census data has great advantages for studying migrant labour market 
outcomes. An ordinary household survey may be less likely to obtain a representative sample of 
migrants due to the floating nature of migrants and due to the sampling process. For example, 
surveys sampling migrants from neighbourhoods or communities may under-represent those 
who arrived recently and those who live at the construction site collectively. Census data does 
not suffer from such problems. 
Another advantage of our census data is that, not only can we identify rural-to-urban 
migrants but also urban-to-urban migrants, which allows us to have a more detailed and 
comprehensive picture of labour market integration in the urban labour market as it offers an 
alternative comparison group to rural migrants. 
III.2 Definitions 
Two questions in the questionnaire are used to identify migrants: (1) Where is your hukou 
registration location? and (2) How long have you left your hukou registration location? We define 
migrants as those who have left their hukou registration location for more than half a year and 
disaggregate them into four categories according to the place where they were living at the time 
of the survey (city, town or village) and their hukou type (rural or urban). Namely, we define 
these categories as follows: 
                                                     
12. There are at least two possible reasons for the difference. First, our data does not include Hong Kong, 
Macau, and Chinese Taipei, while the Chinese Statistical Yearbook does. Second, military staff may be 
underrepresented in our sample. 
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rural-to-rural: individuals with rural hukou status who have moved to another rural area 
(village or town). 
rural-to-urban: individuals with rural hukou status who have moved to an urban area 
(city). 
urban-to-rural: individuals with urban hukou status who have moved to a rural area 
urban-to-urban: people with urban hukou status who have moved to another urban area. 
The sample sizes of these four types of migrants are 38.7, 159.5, 12.5, and 116.8 thousand 
respectively. Given the fact that our sample is a 1/5th draw from the 1 per cent national census, 
we can estimate the corresponding totals for these four groups, which are 19.4, 79.7, 6.3, and 
58.4 million respectively13. The total number of migrants is approximately 164 million, nearly 
12.5 per cent of the entire population. The shares of the above four types of migrants are 1.5 per 
cent, 6.1 per cent, 0.5 per cent, and 4.5 per cent of the total population14. 
We also disaggregate migrants by the reason they give for leaving their hukou registration 
location (see Table A2 in Appendix 1). Across all groups, most migrants move for work, and this 
is especially true for rural-to-urban migrants (the share approximately 61 percent). People also 
migrate for other reasons; for rural-to-rural migrants, the second largest reason is marriage 
(which accounts for 19 per cent), while for rural-to-urban migrants, the second most important 
reason is to be with their families (relatives). Marriage is also a major reason for this type of 
migration. The number of urban-to-urban migrants is also large, but the share of those who 
move for job opportunities is relatively small (only 20 per cent). 
As we are mainly concerned with urban labour market outcomes, we focus on the 
following three groups: rural-to-urban migrants, urban-to-urban migrants, and urban residents 
(non-movers). In addition, we restrict our sample to those out of school and aged 16 to 60 and 
those who migrate to look for work and for business reasons. 
This paper also accounts for the evidence linked to the segmented nature of the Chinese 
urban labour market15 by extending the analysis to formal and informal employment. Our data 
allows for two definitions of informal employment: (a) self-employment and (b) the absence of a 
formal labour contract16. As it will be shown, these two mutually exclusive definitions allow for 
                                                     
13. The unweighted results are 14.2 millions, 66.4 million, 3.8 million and 43.7 million respectively, 
summing up to 128 million. 
14. It is difficult to compare the magnitude of migrants to other papers since different researchers use 
different criteria to identify migrants depending on data availablility. For example, Cai and Wang 
(2003) find there are 131 million rural migrants using the 2006 Chinese agricultural census, which is in 
fact larger than the one we use (99.1 million). The difference between this figure and our figure of 
128 million can be explained by comparing how migrants are defined. The definition of a migrant in 
their study is based on whether individuals ‚spent at least one month outside their home counties‛. 
15. For example, Meng and Miller (1995) emphasize segmentation based on occupation while Demurger 
et al. (2008) emphasize segmentation based on ownership. 
16. For the remainder of the text we will reference this group as the ‘no contract’ group. 
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some degree of heterogeneity within informal employment. Both are characterised by the lack of 
social security coverage. Employees with a formal contract, whether long-term or short-term, are 
defined as being formally employed. Adding industry and occupation dummies in our 
regressions does not significantly alter our results. 
III.3 A Few Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics are reported in Tables 1 and 2. Our data show that urban residents 
(non-movers) are gender balanced, quite educated, mostly all married and that many are 
working in the formal sector, and particularly in the public sector. Self-employed workers are 
typically older, less educated and male, while showing higher income earnings than ‘no contract’ 
employees. 
Rural migrants are younger, less educated and more likely to be male. Again, we observe 
differences depending on the definition of informal employment we use. The self-employed are 
older and less educated while formal workers have similar characteristics as the ‘no contract’ 
employees. Urban migrants are similar to rural migrants in terms of age, gender balance and 
marriage status but have much higher education levels and also earn the most. In terms of 
informal employment, self-employed workers earn more than workers without a contract for 
both types of migrants, but the opposite is observed for urban residents, where waged 
employees earn more than the self-employed. One possible explanation is the high number of 
individuals working in the public sector and forming the group employed in so-called iron rice 
bowl jobs. 
Apart from comparing average earnings, we also plot income distributions for each group 
(see Figures 1 to 4 below). When we compare the income distributions of urban residents, rural 
migrants and urban migrants (Figure 1) that of rural migrants has the smallest dispersion. 
Taking the income distribution of urban residents as a benchmark, that of rural migrants falls 
disproportionally on the lower-medium part of the benchmark distribution. This is just the 
opposite for urban migrants. It has greater dispersion, and it falls disproportionally on the 
upper-half of the benchmark distribution. Although the distributions have different shapes and 
positions, they are generally ‚normal‛. This paper looks at the mean income differential as 
opposed to the income differential along the whole range of the income distribution and 
attempts to explain the difference between these three income distributions. 
In Figures 2 to 4, we disaggregate the income distribution of each group into three 
categories: formal employment, self-employment, and ‘no contract’ employees. There are 
noticeable differences between formal and informal employment, and between the self-employed 
and the group of ‘no contract’ employees. This is an indication that segmentation exists between 
formal and informal employment, and there is some degree of heterogeneity within the informal 
sector. 
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Figure 1. Distribution for Urban Residents, Rural Migrants and Urban Migrants 
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Figure 2. Distributions for Formal and Informal Employment, Urban Residents 
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Figure 3. Distributions for Formal and Informal Employment, Rural Migrants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Distributions for Formal and Informal Employment, Urban Migrants 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 Urban residents Rural migrants Urban migrants 
 total formal self-emp no contr total formal self-emp no contr total formal self-emp no contr 
age 39.9 40.7 39.1 37.1 30.5 29.6 35.8 29.1 32.5 32.4 36.8 30.5 
education levels             
     Primary and below  0.10 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.21 0.17 0.31 0.22 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.06 
     junior middle school 0.37 0.35 0.53 0.34 0.62 0.62 0.57 0.64 0.32 0.26 0.46 0.38 
     senior middle school 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.32 0.15 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.36 
     College and above 0.22 0.22 0.04 0.29 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.26 0.34 0.10 0.20 
# of people in the household 3.65 3.61 3.88 3.71 4.75 5.31 3.17 4.89 3.47 3.48 2.95 3.71 
gender 1.50 1.53 1.37 1.44 1.44 1.52 1.30 1.43 1.44 1.45 1.36 1.46 
marital status. 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.34 0.38 0.08 0.42 0.33 0.34 0.10 0.43 
left the hukou within 0.5-3 years     0.57 0.56 0.45 0.63 0.54 0.52 0.49 0.59 
occupation             
     Manager, officials, < 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.02 
     technician (professional) 0.23 0.28 0.04 0.23 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.19 0.05 0.13 
     administrative staff 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.17 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.01 0.08 
     service staff 0.26 0.18 0.64 0.27 0.34 0.25 0.64 0.29 0.45 0.33 0.71 0.47 
     related to ag, forestry, fishery ect. 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 
     related to manufacture/transport/ect. 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.56 0.60 0.30 0.63 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.29 
employment status             
     employee 0.82 0.91 0.00 1.00 0.74 0.78 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.76 0.00 1.00 
     employer 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.19 0.00 0.00 
     self-employed 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.00 
     household worker 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 
ownership             
     public sector 0.26 0.28 0.00 0.34 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.04 
     SOE 0.26 0.39 0.00 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.07 
     collective owned enterprises 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.05 
     Family business (registered) 0.19 0.07 0.82 0.15 0.35 0.22 0.79 0.28 0.35 0.21 0.89 0.27 
     private enterprises 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.23 0.34 0.36 0.00 0.47 0.32 0.33 0.00 0.45 
     other work unit 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.26 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.08 
     others 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.05 
monthly income 1058 1188 848 902 973 1100 982 878 1527 1905 1231 1133 
hourly income 6.12 7.04 4.23 5.19 4.61 5.38 4.57 4.07 8.25 10.62 6.11 5.92 
type of contract             
     Fixed short term 0.21 0.34  0.00 0.34 0.94  0.00 0.43 0.81  0.00 
     long term contract 0.41 0.66  0.00 0.02 0.06  0.00 0.10 0.19  0.00 
     no contract 0.38 0.00  1.00 0.64 0.00  1.00 0.47 0.00  1.00 
no unemployment insurance 0.69 0.63 0.94 0.78 0.95 0.88 1.00 0.98 0.76 0.63 0.95 0.90 
no pension 0.45 0.38 0.77 0.55 0.89 0.76 0.98 0.96 0.61 0.44 0.79 0.81 
no medical insurance 0.46 0.41 0.81 0.52 0.85 0.71 0.94 0.93 0.64 0.48 0.84 0.83 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Recent and Non-Recent Migrants 
 Rural migrants Urban migrants 
 Recent Non recent Recent Non Recent 
age 28.3 33.5 30.7 34.5 
education levels     
     Primary and below  0.19 0.25 0.05 0.06 
     junior middle school 0.65 0.58 0.32 0.33 
     senior middle school 0.15 0.15 0.36 0.35 
     College and above 0.02 0.02 0.27 0.25 
# of people in the household 5.27 4.06 3.60 3.31 
gender 1.47 1.40 1.45 1.42 
marital status. 0.45 0.19 0.41 0.23 
employment status     
     employee 0.80 0.65 0.75 0.67 
     employer 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.11 
     self-employed 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.19 
     household worker 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 
occupation     
     Manager, officials, < 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 
     technician (professional) 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.15 
     administrative staff 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.09 
     service staff 0.32 0.38 0.46 0.43 
     related to ag, forestry, fishery ect. 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 
     related to manufacture/transport/ect. 0.60 0.51 0.25 0.24 
ownership     
     public sector 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 
     SOE 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.10 
     collective owned enterprises 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 
     self-employed 0.32 0.41 0.34 0.36 
     private enterprises 0.37 0.30 0.32 0.31 
     other work unit 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.10 
     others 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.05 
monthly income 901 1072 1371 1715 
hourly income 4.28 5.07 7.43 9.24 
 type of contract     
     Fixed short term contract 0.34 0.34 0.42 0.44 
     long term contract 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.12 
     no contract 0.64 0.64 0.49 0.45 
no unemployment insurance 0.95 0.94 0.77 0.75 
no pension 0.89 0.88 0.63 0.59 
no medical insurance 0.85 0.85 0.66 0.62 
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IV. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
We use two main empirical strategies in this paper. First we employ a multinomial logit 
model to infer simple correlations related to sector choice and also to generate summary statistics 
for counterfactual predictions. Three multinomial logit models are estimated, one each for urban 
residents, urban migrants and rural migrants, featuring employment sector as the dependent 
variable. Employment sectors are defined as: j = formal, self-employment and no-contract. 
The formal model is as follows: 


J
j
ji
ji
i
X
X
jy
)exp(1
)exp(
)Pr(


 )3,2,1( j          (1) 
where iX  is a vector of explanatory variables related to sector j. 
Second, we use a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition framework accounting for wage 
differences between rural migrants and urban residents17. The income differential between the 
two groups can be decomposed into two parts: one due to differences in individual skill levels 
(the so-called endowment effect) and the other due to the differences in the skill-prices individuals 
face in the labour market (the price effect). The Oaxaca-Blinder model is estimated in two steps. 
First, wage regressions –one for each group (rural migrants and urban residents)– are estimated, 
by assuming wages for each group can be defined as follows: 
g
i
gg
i
gg
i XW    ),( mug            (2) 
where 
g
iW refers to the income (in log form) of individual i where mug ,  refers to 
urban residents and rural migrants. 
g
iX  is a vector of independent variables, including 
education, age, marital status, gender, province dummies, industry dummies and occupation 
dummies. 
g is the intercept for group g. 
If the model is estimated using an OLS model, we can state gggg XW  ˆˆ  , with the over 
bar ‚ ‛ on W and X refering to sample means, and gg  ˆ,ˆ  the OLS estimates for gg  , . 
Differencing out the mean wages for both groups, the typical Oaxaca-Blinder model is then as follows: 
                                                     
17. For the moment we only consider differences between rural migrants and urban residents, and let the 
analysis on urban migrants for later. 
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mmuumumumu XXXWW )()()(         (3) 
The second term on the right-hand side umu XX )(   is the wage differential due to 
differing individual characteristics (such as human capital) in the absence of discrimination. The 
third term, mmu X)(   , measures the proportion of the relative wage differential due to 
discrimination. Discrimination is measured as the residual, or the unexplained difference in the 
regression coefficients. We also calculate a Brown et al. (1980) decomposition (‚Brown‛), which 
additionally considers formal and informal sectors. The full Brown model is elaborated in 
Appendix 2. 
In addition to analysing income differentials using a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
technique, we also look at the differences with respect to sector choice. In particular we 
decompose differentials in sectoral distributions into endowment and price effects18. For this 
purpose we estimate a linear probability model (instead of a multinomial logit model), and then 
use the results to calculate a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition based on sector of employment. We 
do this by defining a dummy variable for work in the formal sector (equal to zero if it is work in 
the informal sector). 
                                                     
18. Or sector-choice structure effect. 
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V. BASIC EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
As indicated, our empirical strategy contains several steps. First, we estimate the three 
multinomial logit models to determine characteristics consistent with sector employment and 
then use these results to predict counterfactual (and factual) sectoral distributions. Second, we 
estimate income equations for different sectors for both urban residents and rural migrants using 
simple OLS regressions, and calculate Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions for each sector using 
results from the regressions. A Brown decomposition analysis is also performed to ensure 
robustness and the results relating to it are reported in Appendix 2. 
V.1. Results of the Sector Choice Model  
Table 3 presents the marginal effects of the multinomial logit regression for sector choice. 
For urban residents, age, education, gender, and marital status all have significant effects on 
sector employment. Taking formal employment as the base category, the probability of being 
self-employed takes an inverted U-shape with respect to age. Individuals with higher levels of 
education, women and unmarried individuals are less likely to be self-employed. The effects of 
these variables on the probability of being in the ‘no contract’ category are quite different. First, 
as people age, the probability of not having a formal contract decreases and after the age of 35, 
the probability changes little with age. The more educated are also less likely to be without a 
contract. The effect of college education on self-employment and ‘no contract’ work is quite 
different however. College education compared to senior middle school seems to have only a 
marginal (and even negative) effect for people working without a labour contract. As the number 
of college graduates increased tremendously in the last several years, the pressure to find a good 
job has also consequently increased and our results may reflect the current situation of many 
college graduates. Finally, women and unmarried individuals are more likely to work outside 
the protective confines of a formal contract.  
The signs of the coefficients for rural migrants are the same as for urban residents (except 
when looking at gender) but the magnitude of the coefficients differs quite a bit. The results in 
Table 3 indicate that the urban labour market treats urban residents and rural migrants with 
identical individual characteristics differently, at least with respect to their choice of sector. To 
see this difference more clearly, we use the multinomial logit model results for urban residents to 
predict the counterfactual sectoral distribution for rural migrants. From Table 4 we see that if 
they were treated as urban residents based on observable characteristics, rural migrants would 
have a different sectoral distribution. Most importantly, approximately 10 per cent of rural 
migrants would be reallocated from the ‘no contract’ category to formal employment, whereas 
the share of the self-employed would not change much. We can expect this to have an effect on 
the income differential between rural migrants and urban residents. 
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Table 3. Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logit Regressions 
 Urban residents Rural migrants Urban migrants 
 Self-employed No contract Self-employed No contract Self-employed No contract 
 dp/dx dp/dx dp/dx dp/dx dp/dx dp/dx 
 s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e. 
Age 16-20 omitted       
age: 21-25 0.022*** -0.144*** 0.059*** -0.046*** 0.053*** -0.061*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.014) 
age: 26-30 0.025*** -0.193*** 0.094*** -0.071*** 0.091*** -0.123*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.016) 
age: 31-35 0.019*** -0.220*** 0.115*** -0.088*** 0.115*** -0.128*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.017) 
age: 36-40 0.019*** -0.227*** 0.132*** -0.103*** 0.124*** -0.136*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.016) (0.019) 
age: 41-45 0.017*** -0.224*** 0.142*** -0.100*** 0.125*** -0.173*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.016) (0.020) 
age: 46-50 0.009* -0.219*** 0.154*** -0.123*** 0.116*** -0.128*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012) (0.017) (0.022) 
age: 51-55 0.001 -0.232*** 0.138*** -0.100*** 0.116*** -0.175*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.017) (0.026) 
age: 55-60 0.008 -0.204*** 0.120*** -0.103*** 0.125*** -0.075** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.035) 
Primary and below omitted       
Junior middle school -0.033*** -0.013** -0.029*** -0.089*** -0.029*** -0.063*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.018) 
Senior middle school -0.089*** -0.082*** -0.050*** -0.177*** -0.073*** -0.169*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.018) 
College and above -0.214*** -0.071*** -0.109*** -0.237*** -0.147*** -0.285*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.019) 
unmarried -0.032*** 0.032*** -0.121*** 0.089*** -0.077*** 0.079*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) 
Female  -0.017*** 0.029*** -0.049*** -0.001 -0.014*** 0.029*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Observations 219712  94621  22214  
Note: the base category is formal employment. region dummies not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4. Actual and Counterfactual Sectoral Distributions 
based on Multinomial Logit Regression Results 
 actual Predicted based on mlogit rural migrants urban migrants 
 
urban 
rural 
migr 
urban 
migr 
Rural migrant 
as 
urban resident 
Urban migrant 
as 
urban resident 
Urban 
migrant 
as 
rural 
migrant 
actual predicted actual predicted 
 
non 
recent 
recent 
Recent as 
non recent 
non 
recent 
recent 
Recent as 
non recent 
Formal  0.585  0.348  0.517  0.457  0.571  0.440  0.345  0.351  0.359  0.535  0.501  0.524  
Self-employ  0.118  0.175  0.147  0.170  0.105  0.162  0.232  0.133  0.168  0.167  0.130  0.139  
No contract 0.298  0.477  0.336  0.373  0.324  0.398  0.423  0.517  0.474  0.298  0.369  0.337  
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V.2. Income Determination for Different Subgroups  
We next consider income determination for formal work, self-employment and ´no 
contract´ employees, for both urban residents and rural migrants. The aim of this exercise is to 
bring out the price difference between the sectors and between rural migrants and urban 
residents. The results pertaining to the OLS regressions are presented in Table 5 and we highlight 
some of the more important results in by plotting income-age profiles and returns to education in 
Figure 6. For urban residents (left panel of Table 5), the income-age profiles vary quite a bit 
depending on sector of work; for the formal employment and the ‘no contract’ employees groups 
income levels increase with age, while for the self-employed income first increases and then 
decreases with age. For rural migrants, however, all three groups show no significant differences 
in the income-age profile. In addition they are quite similar to that of self-employed urban 
residents. Their income level begins to decrease around 25 to 30 years of age. As shown in 
Figure 6, the returns to education are also different; for urban residents there are no significant 
differences in returns to education between formal employment and ‘no contract’ work, whereas 
the self-employed have the lowest returns to education. The same is true for rural migrants, with 
the formally employed having the highest return to education among them. Beyond this, the 
urban labour market also rewards gender and marital status differently. Women’s earnings are 
significantly lower than those of men. The differential is much higher for the self-employed than 
for the formally employed and ‘no contract’ employees. There are only slight differences in 
coefficients between urban residents and rural migrants along gender lines. 
 
Table 5. OLS Regression Results: Dependent Variable=Log(Hourly Income) 
 Urban residents Rural migrants Urban migrants 
 formal Self-emp No contr formal Self-emp No contr formal Self-emp No contr 
Age 16-20 omitted          
age: 21-25 0.114*** 0.113** 0.093*** 0.073*** 0.177*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.006 0.130*** 
 (0.016) (0.045) (0.013) (0.009) (0.036) (0.007) (0.027) (0.119) (0.023) 
age: 26-30 0.227*** 0.108** 0.157*** 0.128*** 0.151*** 0.138*** 0.276*** 0.096 0.191*** 
 (0.017) (0.045) (0.014) (0.011) (0.036) (0.009) (0.029) (0.118) (0.027) 
age: 31-35 0.280*** 0.117** 0.219*** 0.123*** 0.167*** 0.119*** 0.296*** 0.067 0.175*** 
 (0.017) (0.045) (0.015) (0.013) (0.037) (0.009) (0.031) (0.119) (0.030) 
age: 36-40 0.307*** 0.098** 0.239*** 0.098*** 0.140*** 0.094*** 0.304*** -0.005 0.142*** 
 (0.017) (0.046) (0.015) (0.014) (0.037) (0.010) (0.034) (0.121) (0.033) 
age: 41-45 0.307*** 0.064 0.236*** 0.065*** 0.098** 0.040*** 0.279*** -0.007 0.097*** 
 (0.017) (0.046) (0.015) (0.016) (0.038) (0.012) (0.036) (0.122) (0.036) 
age: 46-50 0.318*** 0.017 0.262*** 0.064*** 0.064 0.012 0.182*** -0.012 0.087**  
 (0.017) (0.046) (0.015) (0.020) (0.040) (0.015) (0.039) (0.125) (0.039) 
age: 51-55 0.363*** 0.004 0.311*** 0.095*** 0.054 -0.003 0.197*** 0.041 0.003 
 (0.018) (0.047) (0.016) (0.026) (0.043) (0.018) (0.046) (0.130) (0.048) 
age: 55-60 0.379*** -0.053 0.309*** -0.092** -0.042 -0.065*** 0.267*** -0.096 -0.038 
 (0.019) (0.050) (0.019) (0.036) (0.052) (0.025) (0.065) (0.145) (0.061) 
female -0.132*** -0.225*** -0.164*** -0.136*** -0.249*** -0.159*** -0.164*** -0.198*** -0.145*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.012) (0.028) (0.013) 
Primary and below omitted          
junior middle school 0.178*** 0.121*** 0.186*** 0.158*** 0.171*** 0.150*** 0.214*** 0.187*** 0.171*** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.039) (0.046) (0.029) 
senior middle school 0.366*** 0.225*** 0.374*** 0.368*** 0.277*** 0.314*** 0.444*** 0.324*** 0.360*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.017) (0.008) (0.038) (0.048) (0.030) 
College and above 0.691*** 0.529*** 0.731*** 0.775*** 0.472*** 0.632*** 0.888*** 0.638*** 0.751*** 
 (0.009) (0.023) (0.010) (0.018) (0.059) (0.019) (0.039) (0.060) (0.033) 
unmarried 0.001 -0.061*** -0.034*** -0.015 -0.001 -0.055*** 0.003 0.153*** -0.032*   
 (0.006) (0.020) (0.008) (0.009) (0.022) (0.007) (0.017) (0.052) (0.019) 
          
R-squared 0.424 0.147 0.423 0.291 0.148 0.235 0.435 0.205 0.389 
N 128509 25832 65371 32947 16536 45138 11482 3272 7460 
Note: province dummies and constants not reported. Industry and occupation controlled.   
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Figure 5. Ln(income)-Age Profile 
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Figure 6. Returns to Education 
 
 
V.3. Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Results  
 
Using the results from the OLS exercise on income, we turn to the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition for rural migrants and urban residents. We start by analysing the entire sample and 
then to the sub-samples based on formal and informal sector definitions. The results are shown in the 
first column of Table 6. If sector choice is not taken into account, nearly 100 per cent of the income 
differential between rural migrants and urban residents can be attributed to differences in their 
characteristics (the endowment effect). We then compare rural migrants and urban residents with 
respect to formal and informal employment. The results are nearly the same. Within formal 
employment, 83 per cent of the income differential is due to the endowment effect. For the self-
employed, it’s 92 per cent, and for ‘no-contract’ employees, 160 per cent. The decomposition results for 
‘no-contract’ employees show that if rural migrants had the same level of human capital as their urban 
resident counterparts and were paid as if they are, their income would not only be higher than their 
actual income, but also higher than the income of urban residents. 
Loosely speaking, the differential between rural migrants and urban residents is mainly 
caused by the differences in human capital levels they bring to the urban labour market. 
However, we should be very careful in interpreting these results. In particular, our results 
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indicate that human capital levels are very important, but it does not mean that the differences in 
returns to human capital (both in terms of income and sector choice) are not important. 
Table 6. Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition for Income Differential 
(based on OLS regression results) 
 urban residents 
vs. 
rural migrants 
rural vs 
urban 
migrants 
Urban residents 
vs. 
Urban migrants 
recent vs. 
non recent 
migrants 
    rural urban 
Industry and occupation controlled      
difference 0.238 -0.488 -0.250 0.107 0.183 
Explained (%) 101.7 59.0 16.5 53.2 50.6 
Unexplained (%) -1.7 41.0 83.5 46.8 49.4 
formal employment  Difference 0.252 -0.604 -0.351 0.121 0.179 
                                    Explained (%) 82.6 67.2 38.8 59.3 55.7 
                                    Unexplained (%) 17.4 32.8 61.2 40.7 44.3 
self employed             Difference -0.096 -0.236 -0.333 0.077 0.086 
                                    Explained (%) 92.3 13.4 33.6 11.8 14.0 
                                    Unexplained (%) 7.7 86.6 66.4 88.2 86.0 
no contract                 Difference 0.153 -0.302 -0.149 0.118 0.188 
                                    Explained (%) 160.0 56.0 -40.0 59.6 46.6 
                                    Unexplained (%) -60.0 44.0 140.0 40.4 53.4 
recent migrants         Difference  -0.448    
                                    Explained (%)  58.5    
                                    Unexplained (%)  41.5    
non recent migrants  Difference  -0.524    
                                    Explained (%)  57.5    
                                    Unexplained (%)  42.5    
 
 
 © OECD 2009  29 
 
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
VI.1. Are Urban Residents the Right Reference Group? 
It is useful at this point to go back to the two criteria used to identify rural migrants. The 
first is hukou type, with rural migrants having rural hukou status and urban residents having an 
urban hukou status. The second criteria is whether surveyed individuals left their registered 
hukou location19. It is possible that rural migrants obtain a premium for moving (due to positive 
self-selection into migration), but also be discriminated against due to their rural hukou status. 
These two opposing effects may produce a close-to-zero ‚unexplained effect‛ as was inferred in 
the previous section. The advantage of our dataset is that it not only allows us to identify rural 
migrants but also urban migrants. By comparing the income differential between these two 
groups, we can attempt to separate out the pure hukou effect as both groups are in fact migrants.  
The last two columns in Table 7 report the results of the multinomial logit regression 
results for sector employment for urban migrants. Taking formal employment as the base 
category, the probability of being self-employed increases with age and the rate of increase is 
larger in earlier years. On the contrary, the probability of being without a contract decreases with 
age. Education is negatively related to the probability of being in informal employment. The 
effect of higher education on the probability of informal employment is higher for urban 
migrants than for rural migrants. As shown in Table 8, a counterfactual prediction shows that if 
urban migrants were treated as rural migrants at least with respect to choice of sector, there 
would be less urban migrants in the formal sector (from 51.7 per cent to 44 per cent), and more in 
self-employed and ‘no contract’ groups (from 14.7 per cent to 16.2 per cent, and from 33.6 per 
cent to 39.8 per cent respectively). 
OLS regression results on income determinants are presented in the last three columns of 
Table 5. Highlighting some of the results from these regressions in Figures 5 and 6 (age and 
education coefficients), it becomes obvious that urban migrants have a higher return to age than 
rural migrants, at least for formal employment and ‘no-contract’ informal employment. Most 
importantly, urban migrants have the highest returns to education for each level of education in 
all three sectors.  
The second column of Table 9 reports overall Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results for 
rural and urban migrants by sector. Ignoring the differences in sector distribution, the regular 
decomposition results indicate that nearly 60 per cent of the income differentials between these 
                                                     
19. This twofold criteria makes our research different from most papers that focus on the income 
differential between two naturally divided groups (based on gender or skin colour for example). 
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two groups can be explained by difference in their characteristics and the remaining 40 per cent 
is due to differences in skill-prices. However we find significant heterogeneity across sectors. In 
the formal sector, differences in endowments can explain 67 per cent of the income differential 
whereas in the ‘no-contract’ group (self-employment group) the share goes down to 56 per cent 
(13.4 per cent). It is interesting that the explained and unexplained shares of the income 
differential between rural and urban migrants do not change much if we consider only recent 
migrants or only the non-recent migrants. 
By comparing rural migrants with urban migrants instead of urban residents, we obtain 
quite different results. Rural migrants fare worse than the urban migrants not only because they 
have low levels of human capital but also because they are treated differently due to their rural 
hukou status20. These results indicate that migrants do receive a premium for migrating, and this 
holds true both for rural and urban migrants.  
VI.2. Premiums for Migrants: Urban Residents versus Urban Migrants 
To evaluate the existence and magnitude of a ‚migrant premium‛, we compare urban 
migrants with urban residents. Both groups have urban hukou status with the only observable 
difference being that the first group is made up of migrants. Hence if we find that urban 
migrants have higher income levels not only because of their higher human capital levels, but 
also because of the different skill-prices, this might provide evidence of a premium for migration. 
The simple Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition in column 3 of Table 6 indicates that the 
premium not only exists but that it is also important. The simple overall decomposition shows 
that 83.5 per cent of the income difference is unexplained. For the decompositions by sectors, the 
unexplained shares are 61.2 per cent, 66.4 per cent, and 140 per cent for the formal sector, self-
employed, and no-contract employees respectively.  
Although urban migrants have large premiums in income determination within each 
sector, they seem to detain less of an advantage to some extent in the choice of sector. The results 
shown in Table 4 indicate that if treated as urban residents in sector allocation, urban migrants 
should figure more prominently in the formal sector (57 per cent instead of 52 per cent), and 
fewer in the self-employed group (10.5 per cent instead of 14 per cent)21. This implies that if 
urban migrants were treated as urban residents in terms of sector employment, they would 
moreover have higher income levels. This negative effect is overcome by the large migration-
related premiums migrants receive in terms of earnings. 
 
                                                     
20. Clearly, agricultural hukou status has various implications. For example, we use age as a proxy for 
potential experience. But what really matters is urban labour market experience, which is not 
available in the data. For rural migrants, age is definitely a bad proxy.  
21. This also explains the negative percentages we obtained for the inter-sectoral differences in the Brown 
decomposition analysis (See Table A3 in the second appendix). 
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VI.3. Does Duration of Migration Matter?  
We can think of the migrant premium referenced above as a net average effect for 
migrants as a whole. However, premiums for migrants may differ substantially and the 
heterogeneity may come not only from the type of hukou they have, but also their migration 
duration or otherwise their urban labour market experience. For instance, the Harris and Todaro 
(1970) framework suggests that migrants may first enter the informal labour market while they 
wait and perhaps gather experience for an opportunity at a formal sector job. Unfortunately, it is 
very difficult to find a comparable proxy for urban labour market experience for all three groups. 
In order to evaluate the assimilation effect, we apply our method to decompose the income 
differentials between recent and non-recent migrants. 
For both rural and urban migrants, the duration of their migration episode is important. 
More than 50 per cent of migrants (rural and urban) have less than 3 years of local urban labour 
market experience (we call this group recent migrants). It seems true for both rural and urban 
migrants, that the self-employed tend to have longer migration duration, and the ‘no contract’ 
employees tend to be more recent migrants. To see the effect of duration more clearly, we split 
rural migrants and urban migrants into recent and non-recent sub-groups (Table 2). 
To get a better understanding of the time dimension of migration and obtain 
decomposition results, we estimate multinomial logit models for employment sector for recent 
and non-recent migrants separately and OLS regressions on income determinants for different 
sectors. The multinomial logit results for sector of employment are reported in Table 7 and OLS 
income determination results in Table 8. Recent and non-recent migrants show different patterns 
both in terms of income determination and sector choice, and this is the case for both rural and 
urban migrants. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results, reported in Table 6, show that for 
rural migrants (column 5), 47 per cent of the differential between recent and non-recent migrants 
is unexplained. In the formal sector and for the ‘no-contract’ employee group however, the 
unexplained shares are lower than the overall percentages, which are around 40 per cent. For the 
self-employed, 88 per cent of the difference between recent and non-recent migrants is 
unexplained. This means that the assimilation effect is more evident for the self-employed. This 
is an expected result as setting up a business in an urban area requires financial and social capital 
which may take time to accumulate. The case for urban migrants is similar. 
For sectoral distribution analysis we turn to our counterfactual predictions (Table 4). If 
recent migrants were treated as non-recent migrants, there would be more recent migrants in 
formal sectors or self-employment, and this is true for both rural and urban migrants. 
Nevertheless the difference between the actual and counterfactual sector distributions is not very 
large, and this is closely related to the fact that actual sector distributions of recent and non-
recent migrants are similar. As a result, a Brown decomposition analysis shows that the share of 
the inter-sectoral difference in the total difference is relatively low: -6.3 per cent and 6.8 per cent 
for rural and urban migrants, respectively (Table A3 in Appendix 2). Most of the difference is 
due to intra-sectoral differentials, 58.6 per cent and 46.1 per cent of which can be explained by 
differences in characteristics.
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Table 7. Marginal Effects for Multinomial Logit Results (Migration Duration) 
 Rural migrants Urban migrants 
 Non Recent Recent Non Recent Recent 
 Self-employed No contract Self-employed No contract Self-employed No contract Self-employed No contract 
 dp/dx dp/dx dp/dx dp/dx dp/dx dp/dx dp/dx dp/dx 
 s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e. 
Age 16-20 omitted         
age: 21-25 0.024 -0.072*** 0.044*** -0.029*** 0.065 -0.063 0.050*** -0.056*** 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.005) (0.007) (134.035) (35.751) (0.014) (0.017) 
age: 26-30 0.082*** -0.106*** 0.063*** -0.041*** 0.120 -0.119 0.078*** -0.118*** 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.006) (0.009) (247.253) (64.895) (0.015) (0.020) 
age: 31-35 0.119*** -0.126*** 0.072*** -0.051*** 0.157 -0.129 0.091*** -0.117*** 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.006) (0.010) (324.047) (93.749) (0.016) (0.023) 
age: 36-40 0.147*** -0.151*** 0.082*** -0.050*** 0.167 -0.123 0.098*** -0.139*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.006) (0.011) (345.079) (104.560) (0.016) (0.025) 
age: 41-45 0.163*** -0.137*** 0.087*** -0.062*** 0.165 -0.171 0.100*** -0.159*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.006) (0.013) (341.120) (87.419) (0.017) (0.028) 
age: 46-50 0.179*** -0.174*** 0.098*** -0.066*** 0.154 -0.121 0.092*** -0.118*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.007) (0.017) (318.297) (93.774) (0.017) (0.031) 
age: 51-55 0.158*** -0.167*** 0.087*** -0.018 0.162 -0.158 0.088*** -0.184*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.008) (0.021) (335.117) (89.152) (0.019) (0.037) 
age: 55-60 0.163*** -0.198*** 0.051*** -0.000 0.206 -0.094 0.046* -0.036 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.011) (0.029) (426.133) (147.299) (0.026) (0.051) 
Primary and below omitted         
Junior middle school -0.041*** -0.071*** -0.021*** -0.097*** -0.031 -0.047 -0.027*** -0.084*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (64.458) (41.861) (0.010) (0.027) 
Senior middle school -0.081*** -0.143*** -0.035*** -0.189*** -0.087 -0.137 -0.062*** -0.206*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (179.533) (118.145) (0.010) (0.027) 
College and above -0.210*** -0.153*** -0.054*** -0.276*** -0.177 -0.238 -0.122*** -0.334*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.011) (0.018) (366.213) (228.109) (0.011) (0.028) 
marit -0.158*** 0.122*** -0.090*** 0.053*** -0.085 0.098 -0.069*** 0.055*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (174.859) (41.425) (0.008) (0.015) 
r3 -0.065*** 0.013** -0.037*** -0.013*** -0.018 0.014 -0.011** 0.041*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (36.313) (10.786) (0.005) (0.010) 
Observations 40080  54541  10407  11807  
Note: the base category is formal employment. region dummies not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. OLS Regression Results for Migration Duration: Dependent Variable=Log (Hourly Income) 
 rural migrants     urban residents     
 Non recent   recent  Non recent   recent  
 formal Self emp No contr formal Self emp No contr formal Self emp No contr formal Self emp No contr 
Age 16-20 omitted             
age: 21-25 0.064*** 0.245*** 0.118*** 0.065*** 0.137*** 0.110*** 0.023 -0.25 0.047 0.116*** 0.022 0.129*** 
 (0.024) (0.072) (0.016) (0.009) (0.041) (0.007) (0.069) (0.320) (0.058) (0.029) (0.126) (0.025) 
age: 26-30 0.109*** 0.206*** 0.138*** 0.114*** 0.100** 0.119*** 0.113 -0.245 0.091 0.313*** 0.117 0.182*** 
 (0.027) (0.072) (0.018) (0.013) (0.043) (0.011) (0.070) (0.313) (0.060) (0.033) (0.129) (0.032) 
age: 31-35 0.097*** 0.192*** 0.098*** 0.111*** 0.137*** 0.110*** 0.150** -0.274 0.069 0.311*** 0.077 0.164*** 
 (0.028) (0.072) (0.019) (0.015) (0.044) (0.012) (0.072) (0.314) (0.064) (0.039) (0.131) (0.036) 
age: 36-40 0.060** 0.170** 0.070*** 0.098*** 0.099** 0.092*** 0.145** -0.339 0.009 0.329*** -0.022 0.161*** 
 (0.029) (0.072) (0.020) (0.017) (0.045) (0.013) (0.073) (0.314) (0.066) (0.043) (0.134) (0.041) 
age: 41-45 0.021 0.1 0.017 0.073*** 0.100** 0.032**  0.101 -0.393 -0.003 0.340*** 0.062 0.080*   
 (0.031) (0.073) (0.021) (0.021) (0.047) (0.015) (0.075) (0.315) (0.070) (0.046) (0.137) (0.047) 
age: 46-50 -0.012 0.07 -0.039 0.108*** 0.06 0.028 0.046 -0.457 -0.021 0.186*** 0.114 0.077 
 (0.036) (0.075) (0.025) (0.026) (0.050) (0.019) (0.078) (0.318) (0.073) (0.052) (0.143) (0.051) 
age: 51-55 0.032 0.09 -0.070** 0.127*** 0.003 0.014 0.038 -0.359 -0.07 0.225*** 0.113 -0.05 
 (0.043) (0.078) (0.030) (0.034) (0.057) (0.023) (0.086) (0.320) (0.085) (0.062) (0.151) (0.063) 
age: 55-60 -0.167*** -0.016 -0.094** -0.045 -0.101 -0.083*** 0.214** -0.591* -0.077 0.149 0.307 -0.092 
 (0.057) (0.084) (0.041) (0.048) (0.078) (0.032) (0.106) (0.327) (0.101) (0.091) (0.209) (0.080) 
Female  -0.192*** -0.283*** -0.207*** -0.094*** -0.200*** -0.129*** -0.201*** -0.240*** -0.163*** -0.130*** -0.158*** -0.124*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.005) (0.018) (0.040) (0.022) (0.016) (0.039) (0.017) 
Primary and below omitted             
Junior middle school 0.153*** 0.171*** 0.156*** 0.155*** 0.165*** 0.135*** 0.182*** 0.072 0.169*** 0.254*** 0.373*** 0.173*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.009) (0.011) (0.017) (0.007) (0.053) (0.062) (0.045) (0.057) (0.069) (0.039) 
Senior middle school 0.376*** 0.277*** 0.324*** 0.352*** 0.271*** 0.298*** 0.413*** 0.196*** 0.356*** 0.483*** 0.503*** 0.360*** 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (0.026) (0.010) (0.053) (0.066) (0.046) (0.056) (0.071) (0.039) 
College and above 0.791*** 0.412*** 0.724*** 0.744*** 0.499*** 0.544*** 0.874*** 0.558*** 0.766*** 0.918*** 0.755*** 0.745*** 
 (0.029) (0.087) (0.031) (0.023) (0.080) (0.025) (0.054) (0.085) (0.051) (0.057) (0.086) (0.043) 
unmarried -0.013 -0.001 -0.075*** -0.002 0.011 -0.032*** -0.011 0.128 -0.053* 0.039* 0.181*** -0.009 
 (0.016) (0.035) (0.012) (0.011) (0.029) (0.009) (0.024) (0.082) (0.030) (0.023) (0.065) (0.025) 
             
R-squared 0.314 0.151 0.253 0.263 0.148 0.218 0.438 0.241 0.405 0.428 0.193 0.37 
N 13819 9312 16949 19128 7224 28189 5570 1736 3101 5912 1536 4359 
Note: province dummies and constants not reported. Industry and occupation controlled.  
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VI.4. Decomposing Sectoral Distribution Differentials 
Our analysis has not, until now, revealed any major role played by sectoral segmentation. 
The largest inter-sectoral share we found in the Brown decomposition analysis was 39.5 per cent 
(urban residents vs. rural migrants in Table A3 and described in Appendix 2) with all other 
comparisons less than 10 per cent. We argue that these results do not imply that discrimination 
against migrants in terms of sectoral choice is unimportant. Even a small degree of 
discrimination can be quite significant, given the substantial differences that exist in terms of 
social security coverage, working conditions and pay between the formal and the informal 
sectors. 
To show this we estimate linear probability models (not reported) and use the results to 
calculate Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions based on sector choice. The decomposition results are 
reported in Table 9. In the first two columns, we consider the broad definition of informal 
employment, including both self-employed and ‘no-contract’ employees and compare rural 
migrants with urban residents. It is clear that the sectoral distribution differential is large. The 
fraction of informal employment for rural migrants is 33.7 percentage points higher than that for 
urban residents. The decomposition result shows that only 17 per cent of the difference can be 
explained by differences in characteristics, while 83 per cent remains unexplained. This is in 
contrast to the results we had derived both with the Oaxaca-Blinder and Brown decomposition 
results for income differentials, which indicated the dominant role of the endowment effect and a 
minor role played by sector segmentation. The results here show that there is a significant share 
of differential caused by discrimination in terms of sector choice, which means migrants may be 
even worse off in terms of social security coverage and working conditions, even conditional on 
individual characteristics. 
Interestingly (and likely by coincidence) the unexplained share of the sector distribution 
differential between urban migrants and urban residents is also 83 per cent. However, taking into 
account that the overall sector distribution differential for these two groups is smaller than that 
between rural migrants and urban residents (16.6 as opposed to 33.7 percentage points), the 
extent of discrimination against urban migrants is smaller. It should be noted that urban 
migrants enjoy the highest average income level, and they are better (not worse) off conditional 
on their characteristics in terms of income. However, the results here show that they are still 
discriminated in terms of sector choice.  
What follows naturally is to compare rural migrants and urban migrants. The results are 
also as expected. As these two groups are both migrants, differences in characteristics can 
explain a larger share (around 50 per cent) of the sector-choice differential. Still, half of the 
differential is due to unexplained factors. We interpret this as discrimination against rural hukou 
status. We also consider recent and non-recent migrants separately but the results do not change 
much. The final decomposition exercise for these two groups is to compare recent and non-recent 
migrants for each group separately. The results indicate a large share of discrimination against 
recent migrants. As differentials between recent and non-recent migrants are not very large, the 
decomposition results is of minor importance for us. However, because we use a broad definition 
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of informal employment, the small differentials may be caused by composition change within the 
broad informal employment definition. 
In the next four columns of Table 9, we consider self-employment and ‘no-contract’ 
employees separately. The general pattern is similar to the one found in the first two columns, 
but with a slight variation. There are at least two points worth mentioning. First, due to the small 
fraction of self-employment in all three groups, the difference between groups is relatively small, 
especially when we compare non-recent rural and urban migrants. Second, when we compare 
recent and non-recent migrants, there are larger sector distribution changes than under the broad 
informal definition. For both rural and urban migrants, the fraction of self-employed is larger for 
non-recent migrants than for recent migrants, and the fraction of ‘no-contract’ employees is 
smaller. 
 
Table 9. Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Results for Sector Choice 
(based on Linear Probability Model) 
 
  Different definitions of informal employment 
  Self-employed 
+ no contract 
Self-employed No contract 
rural migrants  vs  urban residents 
 difference 0.337 100 0.087 100 0.250 100 
explained 0.059 17 0.034 39 0.025 10 
unexplained 0.278 83 0.053 61 0.226 90 
urban migrants  vs urban residents 
 difference 0.166 100 0.057 100 0.109 100 
explained 0.028 17 -0.005 -9 0.033 30 
unexplained 0.138 83 0.062 109 0.076 70 
urban migrants  vs rural migrants 
      Total  difference -0.171 100 -0.030 100 -0.141 100 
explained -0.087 51 -0.007 23 -0.080 57 
unexplained -0.084 49 -0.023 77 -0.061 43 
      recent migrants difference -0.189 100 -0.065 100 -0.124 100 
explained -0.099 53 -0.038 59 -0.061 49 
unexplained -0.090 47 -0.027 41 -0.063 51 
      non recent migrants difference -0.153 100 -0.005 100 -0.149 100 
explained -0.072 47 0.013 -267 -0.084 57 
unexplained -0.082 53 -0.017 367 -0.064 43 
recent vs non recent migrants 
        rural migrants difference 0.014 100 -0.087 100 0.101 100 
explained -0.007 -52 -0.059 67 0.052 51 
unexplained 0.021 152 -0.028 33 0.050 49 
        urban migrants difference 0.049 100 -0.027 100 0.076 100 
explained 0.014 29 -0.024 91 0.039 51 
unexplained 0.035 71 -0.002 9 0.037 49 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we use a nationally representative sample to investigate how rural migrants 
fare in the urban labour market in China. This paper is different from the existing literature in 
several important ways. First, our data is nationally representative and is better at capturing a 
representative sample of rural migrants. Second, we distinguish among different groups of 
migrants instead of only comparing rural migrants and urban residents. In particular, we add 
urban migrants in our analysis, and this allows us to separate the rural hukou effect from the 
migrant premium effect. Third, we consider sectoral segmentation in terms of formal and 
informal employment, which is an important dimension of labour market outcomes of rural 
migrants in Chinese cities. 
The main finding in this paper is in stark difference to those in the existing literature. 
When we compare rural migrants with urban residents, nearly 100 per cent of the difference can 
be explained by differences in characteristics, which means the skill-price effect is almost 
negligible. The comparison between rural migrants and urban migrants gives a different picture 
however; 40 per cent of the income differential is unjustified. Given the fact that hukou status is 
the only difference between these two groups conditional on other personal characteristics (and 
migrant status), this exercise is more appropriate for us to detect discrimination against rural 
hukou status. By comparing urban migrants with urban residents, we find significant ‚migrant 
premiums‛. We conjecture that the ‚no discrimination‛ effect we derive from the comparison 
between rural migrants and urban residents may be the result of a counterbalance between the 
discrimination effect against rural hukou and the premium effect for migrants.  
Another result, based on the Brown decomposition analysis, is that sector segmentation 
plays a minor role in explaining the income differential. Sectoral segmentation, however, may be 
important in terms of social security and working conditions and therefore the sector distribution 
differential in its own right is worth studying (and this is overlooked by many researchers). A 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition indicates that migrants (both rural and urban) are discriminated 
in sector choice (more than 80 per cent is unexplained). The extent of discrimination is larger for 
rural migrants indicating a further discrimination against rural hukou status taken the magnitude 
of the differential. The decomposition for differences between sector distributions complements 
the income decomposition in a very important way. 
There are of course limitations in the approach taken in this paper. A first difficulty has to 
do with choosing the appropriate reference group. We take a step forward by using urban 
migrants as an additional reference group. However, this method is also not without problems as 
rural migrants and urban migrants may be different in unobservable characteristics other than 
their hukou status, even conditional on the characteristics we do control for. Another difficulty is 
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measurement error which is especially salient when we are comparing urban residents 
(migrants) with rural migrants. Finally, age (even potential experience) is a poor proxy for urban 
labour market experience for rural migrants. 
The policy implications of our results are clear. In terms of income, rural migrants enjoy 
migrant premiums and suffer discrimination at the same time. Generally speaking, however, the 
reason they may be worse off when compared to urban residents is due to their lower levels of 
human capital. Increasing education levels of rural migrants, and providing them with training 
and relevant urban labour market skills will help increase their earning opportunities. As both 
rural and urban migrants face unfair treatment in sector choice, reforming the labour market, 
notably removing barriers to mobility between sectors, may help increase formal employment 
and well-being. 
Discrimination against rural hukou status is evident in our study and ideally a complete 
cancelation of the system would eventually lead to a more equal treatment on the labour market. 
This, however, may not be practically feasible and in fact remains a central focus of debate in 
China. What is perhaps more pressing is to ensure that migrants have access to basic social 
services, even in cases where they are employed informally. Presently those without such 
coverage face exorbitant costs for health services and in sending their children to urban schools. 
Furthermore, for migrants who systematically move for jobs, obtaining urban social security 
coverage is futile as social security systems are for the most part non-portable and expensive. In 
terms of schooling and childcare, many migrants leave their children back home in the rural 
parts of China, in effect putting more pressure on household members left-behind and adding to 
the already existing social strain caused by migration. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A1 
 
 
 
Table A2 
 Why did you leave your hukou registration location? 
four types of migrants 
rural-rural rural-urban urban-rural urban-urban 
For job or business 49.45 60.81 18.53 19.65 
Job change  0.4 0.61 7.92 6.22 
Employed 0.11 0.16 2.66 1.52 
Training 1.26 4.05 1.55 4.01 
Move house (change living place) 2.01 2.75 4.12 22.5 
Marriage 18.77 5.18 11.83 9.14 
Move with relatives 11.8 15.32 16.38 15.41 
Move to live with relatives or friends 10.5 6.74 14.55 8.97 
Temporary hukou change 1.06 0.37 9.62 4.08 
On a business trip 0.37 0.37 0.26 0.24 
Others 4.28 3.64 12.58 8.25 
     
Weighted sample size 38 724 159 497 12 545 116 790 
     
Unweighted sample size 28 495 132 840 7 646 87 315 
Note: categories 2 and 3 are mainly for those working in the public sector. 
 
 
 
  sample size calculated national population Population from CSY  
  2 585 481  1 292 740 500  1 307 560 000  
male 50.15 50.15 51.53 
female 49.85 49.85 48.47 
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Figure A1. National Representativeness of the Sample 
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APPENDIX 2. BROWN DECOMPOSITION 
Brown et al. (1980) Analysis 
As seen in the descriptive part of this paper, migrants and residents differ in important 
ways when looking at sector distribution, and considering the fact that the income distribution 
between sectors varies substantially, the differences in sectoral distribution between the two 
groups may have a strong impact on observed income. In addition to the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition, we use the decomposition method of Brown et al. (1980) to take into account this 
double selection. 
Formally, we assume wages for the different groups of rural migrants and urban 
residents to be defined as: 
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ij XW                   (4) 
 
where 
g
ijW refers to the income (in log form) of individual i  in sector j, where 2,1,0j  refers to 
formal employment, self-employed, and no contract employees. mug , refers to urban 
residents and rural migrants. 
g
ijX  is a vector of independent variables, including education, age, 
marital status, gender, province dummies, industry dummies and occupation dummies. 
g
j is 
the intercept for category j and group g. If the model is estimated using an OLS model, we have 
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m
jPˆ is the predicted fraction of rural migrants in sector j assuming they are treated as urban 
residents based on their observable characteristics. Following Brown et al. (1980), we define I and 
WD as unjustified differences in intra-sectoral incomes, PD as the justifiable intra-sectoral income 
differentials, and QD and OD as the justifiable and unjustifiable fractions of sectoral segregation. 
So, terms PD and QD capture the share of the income differential that is due to the differences in 
characteristics between urban residents and rural migrants, and the other terms capture the share 
of income differential which is unexplained. 
 
This decomposition procedure is easy to implement. Note that the terms I+WD+PD in 
equation (5) can also be written as follows: 
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j XXXP  . The terms in brackets are simply the 
standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for the j sector, among which 
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j X   is the unexplained part and )(
ˆ m
j
u
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u
j XX  is the explained part of 
the income differential in sector j. Hence we can first decompose the income differential of each 
sector, and sum them up using
m
jP as weights to get the intra-sectoral explained and unexplained 
differences. To get the two parts of inter-sectoral differences, we need to estimate the 
counterfactual sector distribution 
m
jPˆ .  
 
To model the choice of sectors and for the calculation of 
m
jPˆ , we estimate the following 
multinomial logit models: 
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Where j=0, 1, 2 refers to formal employment, self-employed, and no contract employees 
and we use formal employment as the base category. Using the sample of urban residents, we 
can have the estimates of 
u
j ,denoted by
u
jˆ . Then for rural migrants i with characteristics 
vector 
m
iX , if they face the same sector choice structure as urban residents, their predicted 
probability of being in sector j will be: 
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It follows that the overall predicted probability of being in sector j for rural migrants is: 



Mi
m
ij
m
j PP
ˆˆ . 
Then we apply the decomposition procedure of (2) to the differential between urban 
residents and urban migrants and between rural migrants and urban residents: 
22222
11111
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where umstands for urban migrants. Because )()( ummumumu WWWWWW  , 
by introducing urban migrants, we can separate both the explained and unexplained part in (2) 
into two parts: the hukou effect and the migration effect. 
Table A3. Brown Decomposition 
 
urban residents vs.  
rural migrants 
rural vs. urban  
migrants 
urban residents vs. 
urban migrants 
recent vs. non recent migrants 
rural urban 
total differential 0.238  100.0  -0.488  100.0  -0.250  100.0  0.107  100.0  0.183  100.0  
intra-sectoral 0.144  60.5  -0.449  91.9  -0.281  112.1  0.114  106.3  0.171  93.4  
explained 0.174  73.0  -0.271  55.6  -0.067  26.6  0.063  58.6  0.084  46.1  
unexplained -0.030  -12.5  -0.177  36.3  -0.214  85.5  0.051  47.7  0.086  47.4  
inter-sectoral 0.094  39.5  -0.040  8.2  0.031  -12.2  -0.007  -6.3  0.012  6.8  
explained 0.056  23.6  -0.022  4.4  0.001  -0.5  -0.007  -6.3  0.002  0.9  
unexplained 0.038  15.9  -0.018  3.7  0.029  -11.7  0.000  0.0  0.011  5.9  
total explained 0.230  96.6  -0.293  60.0  -0.065  26.1  0.056  52.3  0.086  47.0  
total unexplained 0.008  3.4  -0.195  40.0  -0.185  73.8  0.051  47.7  0.097  53.2  
 
Based on the results from the multinomial logit regressions (Tables 3 and 7), the Brown 
decomposition results are presented in Table A3. First, intra-sectoral differences can explain 
more than 60% of the total income differentials. The remaining 40 per cent can be explained by 
inter-sectoral difference. In total, 97 per cent of the difference in income between rural migrants 
and urban residents can be explained by differences in their personal characteristics, operating 
either through income determination within sectors, or through the choice of sector. As was the 
case with the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analysis, we should be wary on how to interpret 
these results. For example, the unexplained inter-sectoral figure represents about 16 per cent of 
the total income differential, which is not a minor contribution. Nearly 92 per cent of the total 
differential can be attributed to the intra-sectoral differential and 8 per cent is due to inter-
sectoral differential (4.4 per cent explained and 3.7 per cent unexplained). Because of the minor 
role of sectoral choice, it is not suprising that the percentages of total explained and unexplained 
(60 per cent and 40 per cent) are almost identical to the results derived from the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition (Table 6). 
In comparing urban and rural migrants, although the total share of inter-sectoral 
difference is relatively small (-12.2 per cent), it is still worth noting that most of the inter-sectoral 
difference is unexplained, and this is a strong sign that urban migrants are treated differently. 
Nonetheless this negative effect is overcome by the large premia migrants receive in terms of 
income determination. Consistent with the Oaxaca-Blinder exercise, the Brown decomposition 
shows that a large share of income differential between urban residents and urban migrants is 
due to unexplained factors (74 per cent). 
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APPENDIX 3. GENDER ANALYSIS 
Table A4. Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition by Gender 
 
urban residents 
vs. 
rural migrants 
rural vs. 
urban 
migrants 
Urban residents 
vs. 
Urban migrants 
recent vs. 
non recent 
migrants 
 rural urban 
Male       
difference 0.223 -0.488 -0.265 0.132 0.183 
Explained (%) 85 59 26 50 47 
Unexplained (%) 15 41 74 50 53 
formal employment  Difference 0.207 -0.583 -0.376 0.156 0.200 
                                    Explained (%) 65 66 43 61 56 
                                    Unexplained (%) 35 34 57 39 44 
self employed             Difference -0.092 -0.233 -0.325 0.094 0.089 
                                    Explained (%) 93 15 33 7 3 
                                    Unexplained (%) 7 85 67 93 97 
no contract                 Difference 0.158 -0.297 -0.139 0.135 0.183 
                                    Explained (%) 136 56 -29 56 39 
                                    Unexplained (%) -36 44 129 44 61 
recent migrants         Difference  -0.509    
                                    Explained (%)  56    
                                    Unexplained (%)  44    
non recent migrants  Difference  -0.459    
                                    Explained (%)  60    
                                    Unexplained (%)  40    
Female       
difference 0.261 -0.487 -0.226 0.022 0.155 
Explained (%) 121 58 4 -71 50 
Unexplained (%) -21 42 96 171 50 
formal employment  Difference 0.294 -0.604 -0.310 0.017 0.128 
                                    Explained (%) 100 67 34 -160 53 
                                    Unexplained (%) 0 33 66 260 47 
self employed             Difference -0.036 -0.297 -0.333 0.018 0.052 
                                    Explained (%) 109 28 33 -14 -8 
                                    Unexplained (%) -9 72 67 114 108 
no contract                 Difference 0.153 -0.317 -0.165 0.059 0.165 
                                    Explained (%) 185 57 -42 36 39 
                                    Unexplained (%) -85 43 142 64 61 
recent migrants         Difference  -0.560    
                                    Explained (%)  61    
                                    Unexplained (%)  39    
non recent migrants  Difference  -0.427    
                                    Explained (%)  54    
                                    Unexplained (%)  46    
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Table A5. Actual and Counterfactual Sectoral Distribution 
based on Multinomial Logit Podel by gender 
 actual Predicted based on mlogit rural migrants urban migrants 
 
urban 
rural  
migr 
urban  
migr 
Rural mig 
as  
Urban res 
Urban m 
As  
urban res 
Urb 
m 
As 
 rur 
m 
actual predi actual predi 
 
non  
recent 
recent  
Recent as 
non recent 
non  
recent 
recent  
Recent as 
non recent 
MALE             
Formal  0.589 0.326 0.525 0.474 0.581 0.436 0.331 0.322 0.331 0.533 0.516 0.522 
Self-employ  0.127 0.211 0.162 0.197 0.121 0.186 0.261 0.168 0.208 0.180 0.145 0.162 
No contract 0.284 0.463 0.313 0.329 0.298 0.378 0.409 0.510 0.461 0.287 0.339 0.316 
FEMALE             
Formal  0.579 0.380 0.506 0.431 0.553 0.435 0.370 0.386 0.395 0.539 0.480 0.528 
Self-employ  0.104 0.124 0.126 0.130 0.084 0.133 0.182 0.089 0.117 0.145 0.111 0.109 
No contract 0.316 0.496 0.368 0.439 0.364 0.432 0.448 0.525 0.488 0.316 0.408 0.363 
 
 
 
Table A6. Brown Decomposition by Gender 
 
urban residents vs.  
rural migrants 
rural vs. urban  
migrants 
urban residents vs. 
urban migrants 
recent vs. non recent migrants 
rural urban 
Male            
total differential 0.211 100.0 -0.466 100.0 -0.268 100.0 0.137 100.0 0.178 100.0 
intra-sectoral 0.146 68.9 -0.433 93.1 -0.296 110.5 0.139 101.5 0.179 100.1 
explained 0.146 69.3 -0.260 55.8 -0.092 34.2 0.076 55.8 0.084 46.8 
unexplained -0.001 -0.4 -0.173 37.2 -0.204 76.2 0.063 45.7 0.095 53.3 
inter-sectoral 0.066 31.1 -0.032 6.9 0.028 -10.5 -0.002 -1.5 0.000 -0.1 
explained 0.052 24.6 -0.014 3.0 0.003 -1.0 -0.002 -1.8 0.001 0.7 
unexplained 0.014 6.4 -0.018 3.9 0.025 -9.4 0.000 0.3 -0.001 -0.8 
total explained 0.199 94.0 -0.274 58.8 -0.089 33.2 0.074 54.0 0.085 47.5 
total unexplained 0.013 6.0 -0.192 41.2 -0.179 66.8 0.063 46.0 0.094 52.5 
Female            
total differential 0.261 100.0 -0.487 100.0 -0.233 100.0 0.026 100.0 0.129 100.0 
intra-sectoral 0.183 70.2 -0.460 94.4 -0.266 114.3 0.039 148.2 0.129 100.2 
explained 0.248 95.0 -0.281 57.7 -0.050 21.6 0.000 1.1 0.056 43.8 
unexplained -0.065 -24.8 -0.179 36.7 -0.216 92.7 0.039 147.1 0.073 56.4 
inter-sectoral 0.078 29.8 -0.027 5.6 0.033 -14.3 -0.013 -48.2 0.000 -0.2 
explained 0.062 23.6 -0.011 2.2 0.003 -1.3 -0.008 -30.8 0.001 1.0 
unexplained 0.016 6.2 -0.016 3.4 0.030 -12.9 -0.005 -17.4 -0.001 -1.2 
total explained 0.309 118.6 -0.291 59.9 -0.047 20.3 -0.008 -29.7 0.058 44.7 
total unexplained -0.049 -18.6 -0.195 40.1 -0.186 79.7 0.034 129.7 0.071 55.3 
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